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1957] RECENT DECISIONS 1015 
CORPORATIONS - LIQUIDATION UPON DEADLOCK IN CLOSELY-HELD CORPO-
RATION - INTERPRETATION OF WISCONSIN STATUTE - Plaintiff, as trustee of 
an estate, held fifty percent of the shares of a going corporation. An elec-
tion to fill all four positions on the corporation's board of directors was 
held. Since a by-law required that directors be shareholders, plaintiff was 
the only member of his own faction for whom he could vote. The oppos-
ing faction, holding the remaining fifty percent of the shares, had four 
eligible candidates. Votes for each of the four were cast, with one receiv-
ing one vote less than the other three. Plaintiff voted all of his shares 
1016 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
for himself and also cast a vote of all his shares "against any other candi-
dates for director." The chairman ruled this negative vote a nullity and 
found that plaintiff and three members of the opposing faction were 
elected. Plaintiff, claiming that a deadlock existed, brought an action to 
liquidate the corporation. The trial court upheld the chairman's ruling, 
and found that there was no deadlock. On appeal, held, reversed. Plain-
tiff's negative vote was not a nullity, and, therefore, a voting deadlock did 
exist which perpetuated a split in the board of directors. A receiver should 
be appointed and liquidation carried through even though there was no 
showing of irreparable injury to the corporation, unless the parties arrange 
a stock transfer within a stipulated time. Strong v. Fromm Laboratories, 
(Wis. 1956) 77 N.W. (2d) 389. 
The court's action in ordering liquidation was based on a 1951 Wis-
consin statute, which authorizes a court to liquidate a going concern 
because of a voting deadlock, and does not require that a plaintiff show 
as a result of the deadlock irreparable injury to the corporation or, alter-
natively, mismanagement of some kind.1 The trial court in the principal 
case had expressly found that liquidation would be detrimental to both 
parties, but the appellate court held that under the statute it is no longer 
the province of the trial court to consider this factor. Upon finding that 
the statutory requirements have been met, the court must decree liquida-
tion. The court pointed out that a split board of directors cannot manage 
a corporation in the manner required by the statutes of the state. 
It has been held in cases involving a voting deadlock that the equity 
court had power to grant a dissolution where such a measure was the only 
adequate relief available.2 There has been a divergence of judicial reac-
tion to statutes which provide for, or at least arguably allow, dissolution 
on mere deadlock.3 The New York courts require a showing that such a 
decree would be beneficial to the stockholders.4 At least one writer has 
1 Wis. Stat. (1955) §180.771, "(I) Circuit c.ourts have power to liquidate ... a cor-
poration: (a) ... when it is established: ••. (4) that the shareholders are deadlocked in 
voting power, and have failed, for a period which includes at least 2 consecutive annual 
meeting dates, to elect successors to directors .•.. " 
2 E.g., the Michigan court has held that where the dissension is so serious that under 
the circumstances it will inevitably defeat the purpose for which the corporation was 
created, equity could decree a dissolution. The court noted that such a circumstance was 
particularly likely to occur in the closed corporation, which it compared to the partnership. 
Flemming v. Heffner and Flemming, 263 Mich. 561, 248 N.W. 900 (1933). See cases col-
lected in 13 A.L.R. (2d) 1260 (1950). 
3 The Pennsylvania statute expressly requires a showing of irreparable injury, suffered 
or threatened, before dissolution of a deadlocked corporation is allowed. Pa. Stat. Ann. 
(Purdon, 1938) tit. 15, §2852-1107. Cf. Minn. Stat. (1953) §301.49; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) 
§351.485. See also Cal. Corp. Code Ann. (Deering, 1953) §4651; Fla. Stat. (1955) §608.28; 
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32, §157.86; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §271.570; La. Rev. Stat. (1950) 
§12:55-56; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 155, §50; N.J. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1956) §14:13-15; 
Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, Supp. 1956) §1701.91; Wash. Rev. Code §23.44.030. See gen-
erally CORPORATION MANUAL, 1957 ed., Tit. VIII, §48. 
4 22 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1943; Supp. 1956) §§101, 103, 117. The New York 
statute is ambiguous. After stating that benefit to stockholders is one of three alternative 
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indicated that the New York court's reluctance to dissolve is in proportion 
to the company's prosperity, and that some additional factor (such as 
mismanagement) must be present before a dissolution decree will be ren-
dered.5 In other jurisdictions the requirement of actual or threatened 
insolvency is not deemed vital to the decree.6 At first glance, a remedy 
as drastic as dissolving a going concern seems to be a cure that kills the 
patient. A close inspection of the situation where such a remedy is 
usually applied, i.e., in the closely-held corporation, suggests, however, that 
it is entirely in the public interest and does not give shareholders greater 
protection than they deserve. As a practical matter, it is in the closed 
corporation that deadlock is likely to occur. Since each shareholder in such 
a corporation is similar to a "partner" holding some fractional interest in 
the business, blocs of precisely one-half of the voting power can easily form, 
and the remedy of dissolution, which is available to partners who have 
reached an impasse, is quite logically applied to the closely-held cor-
poration.7 
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grounds for dissolution (with insolvency and deadlock being the others) a later section 
says the court may dissolve where it will be beneficial to stockholders. See Matter of 
Cantelmo, 275 App. Div. 231, 88 N.Y.S. (2d) 604 (1949). 
5 50 CoL. L. REv. 100 (1950). 
6 New Jersey, for one, has dissolved prosperous companies. Petition of Collins-Doan 
Co., 3 N.J. 382, 70 A. (2d) 159 (1949). Language in the decision indicates, however, that 
the court could not conceive of a situation where deadlock would not be harmful to share-
holders in the long run. 
7 See Israels, "The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and 
Dissolution," 19 UNIV. CH1. L. REv. 778 (1952). The right of delectus personae preserved 
to partners supports by analogy dissolution on deadlock of a closely-held corporation 
where similar personal relations often exist. See the Michigan decision cited in note 2 
supra. 
